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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 20th century, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine (CPMD), the
contours and content of which are determined by state law, generally prohibits business
corporations from practicing medicine or employing physicians to perform professional
medical services. The doctrine’s origin is rooted in public policy, championed by the
American Medical Association in 1934, when it proclaimed ethical principles for the
practice of medicine.1
The corporate practice prohibition is rooted in the perceived evils that corporations and
laypeople motivated by profit will exert control over physicians, tainting the fiduciary
role of the physician vis-a-vis patient, and compromising the medical judgments of
physicians. There is a corollary to the corporate practice ban whereby states have
imposed restrictions on fee-splitting involving physicians and their services as a way to
mitigate financial influences on medical decision-making. States provide for sanctions
for unauthorized fee-splitting arrangements.2
To this day, the CPMD implicates various interrelationships in the medical sector. Not
all states embrace a strong sense of vitality for the doctrine, and in a few jurisdictions,
the prohibition does not exist. For a majority of states, however, the prohibition’s reach,
and consequences arising from its breach, have import for the transactional lawyer,
medical facilities, physicians, and payors.
The sources of state law on the corporate practice of medicine prohibition are varied. The
corporate practice ban can arise as a matter of common law, state legislative enactments
and regulations. Courts have ruled extensively on the prohibition, and State Attorneys
General, as well as professional licensing boards, have opined on the doctrine.
State legislatures have considered bills to amend the prohibition, re-calibrating the
public policy bases relied upon in the past to adapt to more integration and collaboration
as the new norm in healthcare delivery. This is so, for example, in Texas, where in 2011
the legislature enacted new provisions enabling employment of physicians by certain
county hospital districts.3 In 2011 and 2012, legislation was also enacted in Colorado,4

1

Medical Ethics and New Methods of Practice, 103 JAMA 263, 263–64 (1934); see also Am.
Med. Ass’n Principles of Med. Ethics, ch. 3, art. VI, Section 2 (1937). The AMA’s 1934 Principles,
as interpreted by the ABA’s Judicial Council in 1971, were challenged by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The FTC issued an order requiring the
AMA to end its corporate practice restraints. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the FTC’s
decision. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme
Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision in a per curiam opinion. 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The
individual states, though, have pursued their own paths to impose the corporate practice ban under
their Medical Practice Acts.
2

For example, in New York State, the Education Law § 6531 provides for the revocation or
suspension of a physician’s license on grounds of professional misconduct if a physician participates
in splitting of a fee in connection with professional care or services. See also California’s Business
and Professional Code, § 652 (imposing criminal sanctions).
3

See infra.

4

SB 11-084 (Colorado).
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Tennessee5 and Washington6 lifting the corporate practice ban for the employment
of physicians by nursing homes, and mandating protections to ensure a physician’s
independent decision-making.
The moorings for the corporate practice prohibition is in a state’s inherent police powers
to guard the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient from corrupted motives
of the commercialization of medicine and allied professional disciplines. Barring a
corporate entity, or layperson, from owning a medical practice, employing a physician,
or influencing medical decisions safeguards the medical judgment on a patient’s health
and safety.7 The corporate practice prohibition has withstood constitutional challenge.8
The corporate practice prohibition has attracted heightened interest. This is so because
of trends in hospital-physician alignment and payment regimes for a more integrated
health delivery system. For these reasons, healthcare attorneys are best advised to
become knowledgeable on the corporate practice of medicine prohibition as it may
apply, as a matter of state law, in various state jurisdictions.
Noncompliance with a state’s corporate practice ban has ramifications. State laws provide
for criminal sanctions, including for aiding and abetting.9 Additionally, physicians and
other medical professionals risk disciplinary action by a licensing board.10 Separate
from these punitive measures, a state attorney general may seek to dissolve, or enjoin,
an illicitly formed entity.11 There are other implications as well for contracting parties,
between insurers and providers of care, and those employed by healthcare entities.
The CPMD, then, is one that should give pause to attorneys representing healthcare
clients, including insurers, on any number of issues. The corporate practice ban can
influence the structuring of a legal entity, define collaborations, or impact reimbursement
decisions. This is particularly germane in contemporary discourse on healthcare reform.
The purpose of this article is to highlight some state laws, and how courts in various
jurisdictions have addressed the corporate practice prohibition in the context of
reimbursement and non-compete clauses in employment agreements. The article will
also mention fee-splitting to raise a level of awareness of rules set by states that prohibit
5

SB 3263 (Tennessee).

6

SHB 1315 (Washington).

7

As observed in Cal. Med. Ass’n. Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 194, 199 (Cal.
App. 2000), the corporate practice of medicine doctrine was “adopted to protect the professional
independence of physicians and to avoid the divided loyalty inherent in the relationship of a
physician employee to a lay employer.”
8

Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563 (1932) (denying appeal for want of a
federal question); Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935).
9

E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-21(n).

10

E.g., I.C.A. § 147.55 and I.C.A. § 148.6(1) (Iowa) (provides for revocation or suspension of
license, civil penalties not in excess of $10,000); see also William Steinsmith v. Medical Board of
California, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115 (Cal. App. 4th Nov. 13, 2000).
11

See, e.g., Bill Schuette, Attorney General of the State of Michigan v. Health Care Clinic, Inc.,
Womens Choice Clinic, Inc., et al., Case No. 11-1507-AW (Mich. 56th Judicial Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011)
(Verified Complaint In Quo Warranto To Dissolve Health Care Clinic, Inc. and Womens Choice
Clinic, Inc. And For Injunctive Relief and Consent Judgment, entered Nov. 21, 2011).
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or limit this practice. The lesson to be learned is that state laws are not uniform, and each
state has pursued its own path of public policy.

II. MEDICAL PRACTICE ACTS
Generally, the ban on the corporate practice of medicine is rooted in the notion that a
corporate or business entity is not able to satisfy the licensure requirements mandated
by state statutes to practice the learned professions.
The starting point for determining whether a state prohibits the corporate practice of
medicine is the jurisdiction’s Medical Practice Act and its definition of the “practice of
medicine.”. A state’s Medical Practice Act imposes licensure requirements. For example,
the Maryland Medical Practice Act mandates that “an individual shall be licensed” to
practice medicine.12 The “practice of medicine” is defined, “to engage, with or without
compensation, in medical . . . diagnosis, healing, treatment [ ] or surgery,” and the
“preventing, prescribing for, or removing any physical, mental, or emotional ailment .
. . of an individual.”13 Exemptions from licensure are noted by statute,14 none of which
apply to entities. Thus, by implication, the Maryland Practice Act prohibits corporations
from practicing medicine.15 Under Maryland law, certain entities whose formation is
governed by specialized statutes do not fall within the ambit of the corporate practice
ban. As discussed further below, these statutes are exceptions, allowing the corporate
practice of medicine, provided enumerated conditions are met. Thus, an entity is not
affected by the corporate practice ban in Maryland if formed as a professional service
corporation16 or a limited liability company.17 Some states impose by statute an explicit
ban on the corporate practice of medicine. In Colorado, the legislature enacted a
provision that reads “corporations shall not practice medicine.”18

III. APPLICATION OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
DOCTRINE TO HOSPITALS
States are divided on the applicability of the corporate practice ban to hospitals.
California prohibits outright hospital employment of physicians. The corporate practice
ban is embodied in California’s Business and Professions Code within the Medical
Practice Act.19 Section 2052 mandates the licensure of any person “who diagnoses,
treats, operates for or prescribes for any ailment . . . [or] . . . disease.” Performing
these acts without a license is a criminal offense.20 Those who assist or participate
12

Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. § 14-301.

13

Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. § 14-101(l).

14

See Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. § 14-302.

15

Maryland is not alone in providing for a corporate practice ban by implication. New York, along
with other jurisdictions, imposes a corporate practice ban by implication, rather than by explicit
statutory language. See N.Y. Educ. L. §§ 6521, 6522 and 6524 (mandating a person to be licensed to
practice medicine, and setting forth licensure requirements).
16

Md Code Ann. Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-101, et seq.

17

Md. Code Ann. Corp. & Ass’ns § 4A-203(10).

18

C.R.S. § 12-36-134(7)(a).

19

Medical Practice Act, Business & Professions Code § 2400, et seq.

20

See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2052(a).
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in committing the offense can be implicated and charged for aiding and abetting.21
California’s corporate practice ban, as applied to hospitals, is in section 2400, which
explicitly states that corporations have “no professional rights, privileges, or powers.”22
Exceptions to the corporate practice ban provided by the California legislature are in the
State’s Business and Professions Code. There, certain entities are permitted to employ
physicians, provided the conditions specified by statute are met. Thus, within section
2400, the Division of Licensing is empowered, in the exercise of its discretion, to “grant
approval of the employment of licensees on a salary basis” by certain specified licensed
entities. These licensed entities are: charitable institutions, medical foundations,
teaching hospitals,23 and clinics.24 For example, under section 2401(a), a clinic operated
for medical education purposes by a non-profit university medical school may charge for
professional services by licensees who are on the faculty of the university. Additionally,
under section 2401(b), a non-profit clinic operating pursuant to specified criteria25 for
charitable purposes may employ licensees and may charge for those services. However,
it is explicitly provided that the clinic is prohibited from interfering with or controlling
the professional decision-making of the physician or surgeon. Under section 2401(d),
a hospital owned and operated by a health care district may employ a licensee and
may impose charges for services if the physician or surgeon approves of the charges.
It is explicitly provided, though, that the hospital shall not interfere with or control the
judgments of the licensees.
California’s general ban on hospital employment of physicians is in stark contrast to
the law in Illinois. In Illinois, duly licensed hospitals may, as a matter of law, employ
physicians. This exception in Illinois was established by the seminal case of Berlin v.
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center.26 The exception carved out for hospitals in Illinois,
arising from Berlin is a narrow one. In that case, the Supreme Court of Illinois explained
that the CPMD is rooted in a state’s Medical Practice Act, in which education and training
are mandated to obtain a professional license to practice medicine. Since corporations
do not have the ability to undergo the rigorous licensing requirements imposed under the
Medical Practice Act, such entities cannot lawfully practice medicine. The Court further
wrote that, generally, in theory, hospitals cannot employ physicians since the actions
of physicians while under the employ of a hospital would be imputed to the hospital
which is not eligible to obtain a license for the practice of medicine. The Supreme Court
of Illinois in Berlin also emphasized that the corporate practice ban is based on public
policy, which seeks to guard against the profit motive influences of lay entities over a
physician’s medical judgment and their fiduciary role vis-à-vis patients.27 The Court in
21

See id, at § 2052(b).

22

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2400.

23

See Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 79 Cal. App. 4th 542 (2000).

24

California, like many states, imposes fee splitting restrictions. See California Business and
Professions Code § 650. California has also regulated beyond hospital-physician employment, to
include alignments between physicians and management services organizations. See 83 Op. Atty.
Gen. Cal. 170 (July 27, 2000).
25

See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 1206(p).

26

688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997).

27

Id. at 110.

The Corporate Practice of Medicine Is a Matter That Requires Vigilance

5

Berlin examined whether the corporate practice ban would logically apply to hospitals in
Illinois in view of the rationale for the doctrine. The Court concluded that it would not,
and thus carved-out an exception for hospital employment of physicians. The Court’s
reasoning is based on the regulatory regime to which hospitals must adhere in Illinois.
In that State, under the Hospital Licensing Act,28 hospitals are authorized to practice
medicine under a license to do so. The Court observed that In Illinois, the legislature
enacted legislation allowing hospitals, duly licensed, to provide medical services. It
thus concluded that to enable hospitals to perform this function, it was inferred that
hospitals would need to employ licensed physicians. The Court in Berlin put to rest the
public policy concerns that originally motivated the corporate practice ban. Specifically,
the concern regarding corrupt influence of lay corporations over physicians would be
mitigated since a separate medical staff in a hospital is responsible for the quality of
medical services. The Court also noted that hospitals, as licensed facilities, had statutory
duties to ensure the health of their patients.29 In view of the statutory licensing authority
for hospitals in Illinois, and the regulatory regime applicable to duly licensed hospitals
more generally, the State Supreme Court in Berlin concluded there were grounds to
exempt hospitals in Illinois from the corporate practice ban.
Illinois is not alone in its permissive stance on hospital employment of physicians. Other
states allow this employment relationship, notwithstanding a corporate practice ban
generally. Tennessee, for example, has provided by statute for hospital employment of
physicians, with conditions. This provision authorizes a duly licensed hospital to employ
physicians, except where noted, provided that the employing entity “shall not restrict or
interfere with medically appropriate diagnostic or treatment decisions.”30 Tennessee,
though, prohibits hospitals from employing radiologists, anesthesiologists, pathologist,
or emergency physicians.31 This jurisdiction, however, allows research hospitals to
employ radiologists, anesthesiologists and pathologists.32 In Florida, the Medical
Practice Act imposes licensure for individuals to practice medicine,33 but is silent on
the authority of corporate entities to engage in the practice of medicine. The Florida
Board of Medicine has opined on this point, concluding that the Medical Practice
Act does not prohibit licensed physicians as employees of corporations.34 Case law in
Kansas similarly has established that there is no restriction to hospital employment of
physicians. This was made clear in St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss.35
It is noteworthy that those jurisdictions that do accommodate hospital-physician
employment have done so in a way that ameliorates perceived evils underpinning the
CPMD. Conditions on such affiliations, explicit in the statute, preclude influence by the

28

210 ILCS 85/1, et seq.

29

688 N.E.2d 106, 110-114.

30

Tenn. Code § 68-11-205(b)(1)(A).

31

Tenn. Code § 68-11-205(b)(9).

32

Id.

33

Fla. Stat. § 458, et seq.

34

In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Conrad Goulet, M.D., Case No. 89-COM-01 (1989).

35

869 P.2d 606 (Kan. 1994).
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employing hospital over the medical judgments of the physician, thereby ensuring a
degree of professional independence.
Texas has historically been a state with a stringent corporate practice ban, precluding
hospitals from employing physicians. In 2011, the Texas legislature inaugurated reforms
in this area with the enactment of several laws. For example, SB 1661 was enacted
to protect physicians employed by hospital-run, non-profit health care corporations
known in Texas as 501(a) corporations. These types of entities are viewed as a viable
avenue for hospital-physician alignment. The provisions protect the independence of
physicians from lay influences in their treatment decisions.36 SB 894 allowed critical
access hospitals, sole community hospitals and hospitals in counties of 50,000 or less
to employ physicians. Most of these hospitals are run by county governments. This new
law contains provisions to protect physician independence. There were also a series of
separate bills enacted that allow specific hospital districts in Texas to employ physicians,
with explicit provisions to protect the autonomy of physicians.37

IV. APPLICATION OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
DOCTRINE BEYOND PHYSICIANS
States have extended the corporate practice ban beyond physicians to other health
professions, such as dentistry, podiatry, and chiropracty, and other learned professions.
For example, in Maryland, the Dentistry Act prohibits the practice of dentistry by a
corporate entity, except where otherwise noted.38 Florida has similar restrictions for
the practice of dentistry.39 The New Jersey legislature has enacted an explicit ban for
optometry, whereby it is unlawful “for any unlicensed person, or any association or
corporation directly or indirectly to engage . . . in the practice of optometry by utilizing
the services . . . of any person licensed to practice optometry.”40 Where states extend the
practice ban to other health disciplines, there is a notable lack of uniformity,41 and even

36

Tex. Occupations Code §§ 162.0021, 162.0023 and 162.0022.

37

The bills enacted were: HB 1568 (Harris County Hospital District), HB 2351 (Bexar County
Hospital District), HB 840 (El Paso County Hospital District), SB 303 (Tarrant County Hospital
District). In 2005 and 2009, the Texas legislature also enacted bills that would allow Maverick
County Hospital District and Dallas County Hospital District to employ physicians, dentists and
other health care providers. SB 1027 (2005) and SB 1705 (2009), respectively.
38

Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. § 4-603(a),(b), (c). Maryland law allows a licensed dentist to
practice, under the name of the licensee, as an employee of a health maintenance organization
that is properly certified. State law also permits a licensed dentist to practice, under the name of
the licensee, as a member of a limited liability company. Additionally, Maryland provides for the
practice of dentistry through a professional corporation. See Md. Code Ann. Corps. & Ass’ns §
5-101 et seq.
39

Fla. Stat. § 466.0285. Section 466.0285 states that, except for a dentist duly licensed, a
professional corporation or limited liability company composed of dentists, no person may employ
a dentist or dental hygienist in the operation of a dental office, control use of dental equipment or
interfere with a dentist’s clinical judgment.
40

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:12-19.1.

41

E.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. 2005) (Minnesota)
(holding that the corporate practice ban does not apply to physical therapy); Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. No
74-9-4 (Sept. 4, 1974) (Iowa) (opining that the corporate practice ban applies to physical therapy).

The Corporate Practice of Medicine Is a Matter That Requires Vigilance

7

by courts within the same state. This can be readily seen in Minnesota. In that state, the
corporate practice ban applies to chiropractors, but not to optometrists.42

V. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS
It is important to emphasize, as previously noted, that legal avenues exist under state
statutory exceptions for the practice of medicine, and other professional disciplines,
by entities that are formed under explicit statutory mandate for this purpose. By way
of example, North Carolina allows the formation of a professional corporation under
that state’s Professional Corporation Act (applicable to, e.g., medicine, dentistry
and chiropractic).43 There is statutory authority, as well, in North Carolina for the
formation of professional limited liability companies.44 New Hampshire allows for
the formation of this genre of entities, professional corporations,45 and professional
limited liability companies.46 Arizona has legislated for not-for-profit medical service
corporations whereby the provision of services is accomplished through contracts
with physicians, podiatrists, dentists and optometrists.47 California law authorizes the
formation of dental corporations,48 and optometric corporations,49 for the practice of
those disciplines, provided conditions specified by statute are met. Under California’s
Knox-Keene Act, a health service plan may contract with “any professional licensed .
. . to deliver professional [medical] services.”50 Connecticut allows nonprofit medical
foundations to be established for the provision of health care services by employees
and agents.51 New York allows for the formation of not-for-profit medical and dental
expense indemnity corporations and hospital service corporations granting authority
to employ licensed physicians and to enter into other contracts.52 Thus, generally, states
provide statutory exceptions, granting authority to organize entities for the practice of
medicine and other medical professions where services rendered are by duly licensed
professionals. State law usually mandates that all shareholders be duly licensed to
render the same professional services as those for which the corporation was organized.
Additionally, licensees must be designated as directors and officers. States also have
legislated exceptions to the corporate ban for health maintenance organizations.53

42

See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. 2005) (Minnesota)
(holding that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine applies to chiropractic clinics); Williams
v. Mack, 278 N.W. 585 (Minn. 1938) (Minnesota) (holding that there is a statutory exceptions to the
corporate practice ban for optometry).
43

N.C. Gen Stat. § 55B-2(5).

44

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 57D-2-01, 02.

45

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 294-A:2.

46

N.H. Rev. Stat. § 304-D:2.

47

ARS § 20-822(3).

48

Cal. Corp. Code §§ 13401 and 13401.5

49

Cal. Corp. Code §§ 13401 and 13401.5

50

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1395(b).

51

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-182aa et seq.

52

N.Y. Educ. L. § 6527(1).

53

See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 38-33-50(A)(3) (South Carolina); N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 4410(1)
(New York).
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South Dakota is a jurisdiction that has an explicit statutory corporate practice ban.
That State’s Medical Practice Act states that “it is the public policy of this state that
a corporation may not practice medicine or osteopathy.”54 The legislature provided
an exception, however, by allowing a corporation to enter into an employment
agreement with a duly licensed physician provided such agreement does not impinge
on the physician’s independent judgment. Additional restrictions are imposed on the
corporation’s ability to make charges associated with services rendered. The statute also
limits the agreement to three years, and is renewable thereafter annually.55
It is noteworthy that in Ohio, the State Medical Board in 2012 opined on the state of the
law on the corporate practice ban.56 Traditionally, Ohio has been known to have had a
robust CPMD. Essentially, in its 2012 opinion, the Medical Board declared an end to
the CPMD in Ohio. In the Board’s view, the State legislature had enacted various laws
for the formation of entities, including a professional corporation under O.R.C. section
1701.03 for the practice of medicine and other learned professions, thus obviating the
rationale for the CPMD. It is interesting to observe that under Ohio law, a corporation
can be formed under section 1701.03 to provide a combination of professional services.
It is provided that the entity formed shall not control the professional judgment of the
medical professional in rendering treatment. The State Medical Board observed that
although the Ohio Attorney General had previously opined that the CPMD was viable
in the State, his views predated subsequent statutes enacted by the State legislature. In
the Board’s view, those statutes vitiate the vestiges of the corporate practice ban in Ohio.

VI. APPLICATION TO MANAGEMENT SERVICES
In an era that exemplifies collaboration between physician practices and entities
engaged for the provision of management services, the corporate practice ban can
impact the legality of such arrangements. North Carolina has recognized this, and, for
the practice of dentistry, provides by regulation a structure that permits management
services by non-licensed individuals and entities for dental practices. Specifically, the
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners recognizes such management services
agreements provided the arrangements do not entail the practice of dentistry by nonlicensed persons or entities. The state’s regulation of these management agreements
imposes strict criteria, crafted to restrict the control of dental practices, including clinical
and professional services.57
54

SDCL § 36-4-8.1.

55

Id.

56

Statement of the State Medical Board of Ohio on the Corporate Practice of Medicine (March 15,
2012).
57

21 NCAC 16X.0101 (Management Arrangements). The regulation mandates that the
management agreement be in writing, signed by all parties, and describe the services to be
performed by the management company as well as the aggregate compensation to be paid, or the
method of deriving compensation. 21 NCAC 16X.0101(b). The regulation also prohibits ownership
or control of the dental practice, its operations, clinical decisions or distribution of revenues.
No ownership or control may be exerted by a management company over patient records, or
control over the transfer of ownership interests of the professional practice. Compensation to the
management company may not be determined by the profitability of the dental practice, its gross
revenues or net revenues. 21 NCAC 16X.0101(c). The regulation does not preclude setting payments
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Other states have opined on the role of a management services organization (MSO),
vis-à-vis payors and providers. The Attorney General for the State of California issued
an opinion on July 27, 2000,58 expressing concern about the difficulty of separating
business and medical decision-making by the MSO. Where those two functions merge,
there is the prospect that the MCO could be viewed as engaging in the unlawful practice
of medicine. The State Attorney General was asked to opine on an arrangement whereby
an MSO, unlicensed to practice medicine, was paid a fee by a labor union for the MSO
to arrange for radiology diagnostic services that were prescribed by a physician for
members of the union. The State Attorney General wrote that such an arrangement
would result in the MSO practicing medicine without a license. He took issue with
the involvement of the MSO in the details of arranging for the diagnostic services.
Specifically, he explained that the MSO was tasked with duties that were an integral part
of the practice of medicine. The MSO selected the venue and scheduled for the radiology
procedure, ensuring that there would be the necessary equipment and personnel in
view of the patient’s physical ailment. The MSO also selected a radiologist to view
and interpret the films. The State Attorney General viewed these tasks as requiring
professional judgment, and thus the practice of medicine by the MSO. Additionally,
the opinion noted that the MSO paid for the radiology services and added a separate
management fee for profit. The Attorney General objected to this aspect as well, making
clear that this would be a “further intrusion” into the physician-patient relationship.
The decision in Flynn Brothers, Inc. et al. v. First Medical Associates, et al.59 provides
further instruction. There, the court considered an arrangement between a professional
corporation organized under Texas law and a management services company. The
professional corporation, First Medical Associates (FMA), was organized by a
physician, and it was under contract with a hospital to staff its emergency department.
FMA entered into a contract with a management services company, Flynn Brothers, Inc.
(FBI) to assist FMA in administering the contract with the hospital. It was agreed that
FBI was the exclusive agent of FMA, with restrictions on the ability of the physician
owner of FMA to sell his stock in the professional corporation. The contract precluded
FMA from engaging another entity for management services. Additionally, the contract
between FMA and FBI provided for a share of net profits of FMA for the services of
FBI. The court in Flynn Brothers also noted that FBI was the recipient of revenues which
were, in turn, deposited into the FMA checking account maintained by FBI. It was not
unusual for there to be a commingling of funds between the accounts of FMA and FBI.
It was further noted that, to secure a pre-existing FBI debt, FBI pledged assets of FMA.
A dispute arose regarding the contract between FMA and FBI, resulting in a lawsuit.
The court determined that the contract was not enforceable since it contravened the
Texas Medical Practice Act. Explaining that the heightened concern for the physicianpatient relationship, untainted by abuses from lay control of professional corporations
employing physicians, the court concluded that the terms of the contract between FMA
to the management company that takes into account cost increases and decreases of the professional
practice. 21 NCAC 16X.0101(d). All management agreements are subject to advance review by the
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners.
58

Op. Atty. Gen. Cal. 00-206 (July 27, 2000).

59

715 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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and FBI, in practical effect, allowed FBI to practice medicine without a license, contrary
to law. The court emphasized several key points. The FBI management contract specified
that FBI was to receive 66.6 percent of the profits derived from the FMA practice.
FBI had the right to use the medical license of FMA’s owner to conduct business. FBI
also retained the right to select medical staff to work in hospitals under contract with
FMA. All of these things led the court to conclude that the management company was
indirectly practicing medicine.

VII. E
 NFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN MEDICAL PROVIDERS AND PAYORS
The corporate practice ban can have implications in the contractual relations between
medical providers and insurers for the payment for medical services. The ban can also
arise in the context of non-compete agreements for physicians.
A. Payment for Services
Case law has developed in disputes between medical providers and insurers, where
the insurer either sues for the return of payments made to the provider, or refuses to
make payment for medical services, arguing that the contract between the parties is not
enforceable on grounds that the provider has run afoul of the state’s corporate practice
ban. In either one of these scenarios, the insurer contends that the contractual obligation
to make payment is void. The courts have not always ruled in favor of the insurer.
Some courts, as a threshold matter, have determined that the insurer lacks standing to
bring suit. Here, the courts decline to recognize a private right of action for the insurer,
concluding that the authority to enforce a state’s corporate practice ban resides solely
with the state’s attorney general under state law. Thus, in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Andrew Jacobs, et
al.,60 State Farm brought an action to recover payments made to Tacoma Therapy and
Tacoma Rehabilitation for medical services rendered to policyholders. The two entities
provided massage and physical therapy services. State Farm contended it was entitled to
refunds because the two entities were never properly formed under Washington state law
professional service corporations, and thus they were in violation of the state’s ban on the
corporate practice of medicine. The district court for the Western District of Washington
granted a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court concluded that
there was no express or implied private right of action to bring the suit. The district court
observed that state law prohibits corporations from employing medical professionals
to practice their profession. There is, though, an exception to this rule, allowing for the
formation of an entity under Washington State’s Professional Service Corporation Act
(PSCA). That statute allows medical professionals to form, and to be employed by, a
professional service corporation, provided that the shareholders are licensed to provide
the medical services that are offered.61 It was conceded by the plaintiff insurer that
there was no express private right of action under the PSCA. The issue was whether the
insurer had an implied private right to sue for recovery of monies paid. The district court
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declined to find such an implied right. To reach that conclusion, the court explained that
the purpose of the legislature in enacting the PSCA was to preclude layperson influences
on the doctor-patient relationship. Thus, insurers were not within the class for whose
benefit the PSCA was enacted. The court wrote that the PSCA expressly provides that
enforcement of the PSCA resides with the state.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Mobile Diagnostic Imaging,
Inc.,62 the District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled against State Farm in an
action brought by the insurer to relieve it of payment obligations to Mobile Diagnostic
Imaging (MDI) for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans performed for State
Farm’s insureds. In that case, MDI was in the business of doing MRI scans, and hired
technicians for this purpose. Once the scans were done, MDI forwarded the results of
the scans to physicians and radiologists with whom MDI independently contracted to
interpret the results and write a report on the findings from the scan. These physicians
and radiologists were employed separately by ProScan Reading Service (ProScan). In
Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, State Farm contended that it was relieved of making further
payments, on behalf of its insureds, to MDI for MRI scans since, in State Farm’s view,
MDI was in violation of Minnesota’s ban on the corporate practice of medicine. The
district court disagreed, and rejected the insurer’s attempts to be relieved of payments
to MDI on behalf of its insureds. First, State Farm argued that the technical component
of the MRI scan was indivisible with the professional component of interpreting the
scan, which was done by licensed medical professionals. According to State Farm, the
MRI scanning procedure, as a whole, required the involvement of a licensed medical
professional. Thus, the corporate practice ban was implicated, and MDI was in violation
of it. The district court declined to reach this result. The court took note that under
Minnesota law, a diagnostic imaging facility can be organized by laypeople,63 suggesting
that the MRI service itself can be performed by an unlicensed professional. The court’s
reading of the state statute thus provided for divisibility between the performance
of the MRI scan and the interpretation of the test results. The court rejected State
Farm’s assertion that MDI technologists exercise independent professional judgment
as unsupported by the evidence. State Farm pressed other points. It asserted that the
actual performance of the scans by MDI, a lay organized entity, was itself a violation
of the corporate practice ban. The court rejected this argument, explaining that the
62
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technicians employed by MDI were not state-licensed professionals. Finally, State Farm
also argued that MDI relationship with the physicians and radiologists, as independent
contractors, ran afoul of the corporate practice ban. This was so since, in State Farm’s
view, MDI used these professionals to interpret the scans and write a report on the
findings. Thus, MDI was indirectly practicing medicine. The district court disagreed. It
observed that MDI communicates directly with the patient’s physician by transmitting
the scans and the reports done by ProScan that interpret the scans. Thus, MDI has no
direct communication with the patient’s physician that would suggest the unlicensed
practice of medicine.
Courts have declined to adopt a per se rule that would vitiate contractual duties for
the payment of services rendered to an insured’s enrollees where the medical provider
is organized in violation of a state’s corporate practice ban. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota took this position in Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Insurance
Co.64 There, the Court ruled that an insured’s duty to pay must be honored where there
is no determination that the owners exhibited a “knowing and intentional failure”65 to
adhere to a state’s corporate practice ban. In Isles Wellness, three clinics, with a sole
shareholder, were organized under Minnesota’s Business Corporation Act,66 and they
provided chiropractic, massage, and physician therapy services. The owner was not
licensed as a chiropractor; rather, the clinics hired chiropractors to provide services to
the clinic’s patients. Services were covered by the state’s No-Fault Insurance Act, with
patients assigning their insurance claims to the clinics. Two insurers had been paying
under this insurance program for services rendered by the clinics; however, the insurers
ceased payments, contending that there was no contractual duty to pay for the clinic’s
services. The insurers insisted that, since the clinics employed chiropractors, the clinics
were in violation of the CPMD, and thus, as a matter of public policy, the contracts were
void.67 The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed. The court wrote that the inquiry is
whether the illegality has “ tainted the transaction.”68 It ruled that, as a matter of law, a
contract is not void as against public policy “unless it is injurious to the interests of the
public.”69 The court emphasized that the corporate practice ban is aimed to protect the
fiduciary role of physicians in making medical judgments, and to guard against conflicts
that arise from profit motives. In Isles Wellness, the clinics, in seeking payment from the
insureds, argued that the hired licensed chiropractors rendered services, thus allowing
contracts with the insurers to be upheld on fairness grounds. The Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected a bright-line rule that would have necessitated vitiating the contracts.
It emphasized that the clinics hired licensed professionals. While state law allows for
the voiding of contracts in violation of public policy, that need not always be the result.
Voiding the contracts would do little to vindicate the policy for the corporate practice
ban, to protect the public from lay control over the judgments of physician. On the other
64
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hand, the court emphasized that voiding the contracts would unjustly enrich the insurers
since their insureds reaped the benefits of medical treatment. The court concluded that
since there was no evidence that the clinics intended to organize in violation of state law,
fairness dictated that the contracts be enforced.
Similarly, in California Physicians’ Service v. Aoki Diabetes Research Institute70 Blue
Shield, a health care service plan organized under California’s Knox-Keene Act,71
entered into a contract with Aoki Diabetes Research Institute (ADRI) whereby Blue
Shield would reimburse ADRI for services rendered to Blue Shield subscribers. A
dispute arose over Blue Shield’s duty to continue payments to ADRI for services being
rendered to Blue Shield’s subscribers. Blue Shield brought suit for declaratory judgment
seeking to establish that it was not obligated to reimburse ADRI. One of the arguments
pressed by Blue Shield was that ADRI was in violation of California’s corporate practice
ban since, as a non-profit corporation, it contracted with licensed physicians to render
services. That relationship was not permitted under state law. The Court of Appeal
of California agreed that ADRI was doing business contrary to the state’s corporate
ban. It nonetheless declined to declare the contract between Blue Cross and ADRI
unenforceable. The court emphasized that the contract between Blue Shield and ADRI
was not malum in se, but rather was malum prohibitum. Moreover, citing Isles Wellness
v. Progressive,72 the court explained that to declare the contract void would raise the
specter of unjustly enriching Blue Shield for services rendered to its subscribers without
reimbursing ADRI. The court wrote that allowing Blue Shield to avoid payment would
not vindicate the policy behind the corporate practice ban, that of protecting patients
from the lay influence over medical judgments. Thus, although ADRI had not adhered to
the CPMD, the court ruled that ADRI was entitled to receive payments from Blue Shield
for services that had been rendered under its contract.
Spine Imaging MRI, L.L.C. v. Country Casualty Insurance Company, et al.73 is an
interesting case where the court allowed discovery on the issue of the independent
contractor status of licensed radiologists. In that case, filed in the District Court for the
District of Minnesota, the plaintiff, Spine Imaging MRI , was a provider of magnetic
resonance imaging services to patients who assigned their claim for benefits under their
insurance policies to Spine Imaging. The insurers had informed Spine Imaging that in
their view, Spine Imaging was in violation of the corporate practice ban, and thus, the
insurers were seeking recoupment of monies paid to Spine Imaging as assignee under
the insureds’ policies. Spine Imaging then brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment
against the insurers to establish that it was not in violation of the state’s CPMD. Spine
Imaging admitted that its owner was an unlicensed layperson. The business did not
employ licensed physicians or chiropractors. The MRI services provided by Spine
Imaging was comprised of two separate steps, a technical component and a professional
component. Spine Imaging contracted with independent licensed contractors to analyze
70
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the scans. The district court declined to grant the insurers’ motion to dismiss. Of import
to the court was the involvement Spine Imaging maintained after the scans had been
done, when radiologists, as independent licensed contractors, analyzed the scans. Spine
Imaging insisted that its independent contractors exercised their own judgment when
analyzing the scans. Thus, according to Spine Imaging, there could be no unlawful
practice of medicine by laypeople. It was on this basis that the district court denied the
insurers’ motion to dismiss, allowing discovery on the independence of the radiologists,
and implications for the corporate practice ban.
Some courts have ruled against the provider of medical services, in favor of the insurer,
in disputes over entitlement to reimbursement. The decisions in those cases are factspecific, and governed by the state regulatory regime. For example, in Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midlantic Motion X-Ray,74 the insurer sought a declaratory
judgment to establish that it need not reimburse the defendant, a facility for medical
diagnostic testing. Diagnostic testing was provided to Prudential’s subscribers, and
the insurer offered personal injury automobile coverage for such services under New
Jersey’s Personal Injury Protection law. The court determined that the facility was a
“medical diagnostic testing service,” and as such, was subject to state statutory rules
for the formation and operation of such facilities. The court ruled in favor of Prudential,
explaining that the defendant was organized and operated contrary to New Jersey law.75
Under state statute, the facility was required to be owned and controlled by a licensed
physician. Additionally, the test results were to be interpreted by a licensed physician.
However, the court determined that the facility was organized and operated by a
chiropractor, not a licensed medical doctor. Moreover, tests were interpreted by the lesser
licensed individual. Since the defendant was not organized and operated as required
by New Jersey law, the court concluded that it was not eligible for reimbursement.
A similar result followed in Andrew Carothers, M.D., P.C. v. Progressive Insurance
Company,76 a case arising under New York State’s no-fault insurance regime. There, the
court concluded that an MRI provider was not eligible for reimbursement as an assignee
of benefits under New York’s no- fault insurance statute since it failed to comply with
the State’s regulation, 11 NYCRR 65-3.16(a)(12). That regulation, promulgated to
implement the State’s no-fault insurance regime, deemed a provider of health care
services ineligible for reimbursement under the no-fault law where the provider “fails
to meet any applicable New York State or local licensing requirement.” In that case,
the provider of MRI services had organized as a professional service corporation, but
the entity ran afoul of New York State’s licensing laws that required the entity to be
owned and controlled only by licensed professionals. Thus, the court ruled in favor of
the defendant insurers.
Where there is an element of fraud in the formation of a corporation that renders medical
services, resulting in a violation of the corporate practice ban, courts are more inclined
to hold the incorporators accountable, and rule in favor of an insurer that seeks to recoup
or to withhold payments for medical services rendered. For example, in a seminal New
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York case, State Farm Insurance v. Mallela,77 State Farm participated in New York
State’s no-fault insurance regime78 as assignee of claims for medical services rendered
to patients covered by that program. State Farm had brought suit in federal district court
seeking relief, alleging that the corporation billing for medical services was fraudulently
incorporated to evade the state’s corporate practice ban. State Farm sought a declaratory
judgment that it need not pay for medical claims, and, separately, that it was entitled
to equitable relief for payments made for past claims. The district court dismissed
the insurer’s complaint. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York accepted
certification to address whether, as a matter of law, a fraudulently incorporated company
that rendered medical services was entitle to reimbursement under the state’s insurance
law. In this case, it was alleged that medical service corporations were established with
bogus applications filed with the state. The unlicensed defendants had paid licensed
physicians to use their names on papers to establish the physicians as nominal owners of
the entities. The physicians played no role in the medical service corporations. Rather, the
non-physician defendants controlled the business. To further the scheme, the defendants
had the corporations enter into separate contracts with management companies (owned
by the defendants) which billed the medical corporations for services at inflated rates.
This allowed profits to be siphoned from the medical service corporations to the nonphysician owners of the management companies. In rendering its opinion, the Court of
Appeals assumed that the allegations made by State Farm were correct, that the medical
provider was fraudulently incorporated. The Court of Appeals applied implementing
regulation 11 NYCRR 65-3.16(a)(12), a rule that precluded payment for medical
services where “the provider fails to meet any applicable New York State or local
licensing requirement.”79 The Court of Appeals found that the rule was valid, precluding
payment where a provider was fraudulently licensed. It thus ruled, as a matter of law, in
favor of State Farm on its request for declaratory judgment.80
B. Non-Compete Clauses in Physician Employment Contracts
There is a lack of uniformity nationally with regard to the enforceability of non-compete
provisions governing physician employment contracts. Some states have legislated
that such restrictions are against public policy, and thus restrictive covenants in such
contracts are not enforceable. State courts, moreover, differ in their views regarding noncompete provisions. Case law indicates that some courts have taken a dim view of these
clauses, applying a per se rule of illegality and refusing to enforce them. Other state
courts prefer to consider the terms of a non-compete clause in a physician’s contract,
especially the durational and geographic limitations, and render a judgment based on
a rule of reasonableness. In litigation over these restrictive covenants, physicians have
either sought a declaration of invalidity of the non-compete clause, or have asserted a
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defense in an action for breach of contract, arguing that the non-compete provisions in
the employment agreement are not enforceable.
In litigation where the enforceability of a non-compete agreement is at issue, physicians
have separately raised the ban on the corporate practice of medicine, arguing that the
employment contract between the hospital, or other medical facility, and the physician
is itself void. There has been mixed success with this argument. In Dr. Allison, Dentist,
Inc. v. Allison,81 the Supreme Court of Illinois declined to enforce the non-compete
provision on grounds that the employment agreement between the physician and a
dental corporation ran afoul of the corporate practice ban, and thus, under state law,
was illegal. A similar result was reached in a case considered by the Supreme Court
of Kansas, in Early Detection Center, Inc. v. Wilson,82 where the Court addressed a
restrictive covenant in an employment contract between a physician and a general
corporation. In that case, two physicians licensed to practice medicine and surgery
in Kansas formed a partnership, and later established their practice as a professional
corporation. The articles of incorporation restricted the directors and ownership of the
corporation to persons licensed to practice medicine. The physician owners later took
steps to re-organize into a general corporation, and the articles of incorporation permitted
non-licensed individuals to be owners of the general corporation. Following the reorganization, the two physician owners sold a percentage of their ownership interests
in the general corporation to individuals who were not licensed to practice medicine.
The general corporation was in the business of offering medical services, and thus ran
afoul of the State’s CPMD. A dispute over management issues arose involving one of
the licensed physicians, who resigned and then began to steer the corporation’s patients
to another medical provider. The corporation filed suit against the physician, claiming
a breach of the non-compete provision in his contract. The district court declined to
enforce the restrictive covenant, ruling that there could be no contract between a general
corporation and a physician to perform medical services. The court of appeals affirmed,
citing the Kansas Healing Arts Act,83 which imposed licensure requirements and
precluded entities from practicing medicine or offering such services through licensed
practitioners. The court thus reasoned that the contract between the general corporation
and its physicians was not enforceable.
Other courts have similarly ruled in favor of physicians, declining to enforce noncompete clauses in contracts that run afoul of the CPMD. For example, in Nipun
Parikh, M.D. v. Family Care Center, Inc.,84 a corporation sought judgment against a
physician for alleged violation of a non-compete clause in an employment contract. The
Supreme Court of Virginia denied relief sought by the plaintiff after concluding that the
corporation did not have a protected interest in enforcing the covenant not to compete.
The plaintiff was originally organized as a professional corporation, the Family Care
Center, with a physician as its owner and director. At that time, the corporation entered
into an employment agreement with a physician. Whenhe entity’s physician owner died,
81
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by operation of law it became a non-professional corporation. At the time the employment
agreement was signed by the parties, it stated that the entity “is presently engaged in the
practice of medicine . . ..”85 Upon becoming a non-professional corporation, the entity
was no longer permitted to practice medicine. The physician terminated his employment
with Family Care Center, leaving to work for another medical center nearby. The
corporation brought suit to enforce the restrictive covenant. The Supreme Court of
Virginia focused on whether the non-professional corporation had a legitimate business
interest in enforcing the non-compete clause. The court concluded there was no such
interest,noting that the employment agreement containing the restrictive covenant stated
that, at the time it was executed, the corporation was “presently engaged” in the practice
of medicine. At that time, the corporation had a protected business interest in the noncompete clause. The Court wrote that when the entity reverted to a non-professional
corporation, itlost its legal authority to practice medicine. Thus, the Court reasoned
that the corporation no longer had a legitimate business interest in enforcement of the
covenant not to compete.
An often cited case, Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Institute,86 provides instruction on
the mode of reasoning used in Illinois by courts when faced with disputes involving noncompete agreements involving physicians where the CPMD is implicated. In that case,
a board-certified family practice physician entered into an employment agreement with
Alton Health Institute (AHI), a non-licensed general not-for-profit corporation. AHI
was owned by two separate entities, each holding a 50 percent interest.87 The contract
between the physician and AHI contained a restrictive covenant. Disputes arose between
the physician and AHI. The physician filed suit for declaratory judgment, contending
that her employment agreement violated the corporate practice ban, and asked the court
to find her employment agreement containing a restrictive covenant unenforceable.
Defendant AHI filed a counterclaim, and moved for injunctive relief, seeking to enforce
the non-competition clause in the employment agreement. The trial court ruled in favor
of the defendant, in part citing the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center. The trail court read that decision as
carving out an exception to the Illinois corporate practice ban for entities, like AHI, that
are non-profit charitable organizations. The court also held that the non-compete clause
was reasonable on its face, and thus enforceable. The trial court further concluded that
plaintiff had breached the employment agreement. On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed the lower court’s decision. It determined that the trial court’s reliance on Berlin
was misplaced. Specifically, the court of appeals explained that in Berlin, the Supreme
Court of Illinois carved out an exception from the corporate practice ban for hospitals
only. Thus, the trial court had wrongly applied the exception announced in Berlin to
the defendant, a non-licensed charitable not-for-profit corporation. The court of appeals
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wrote that “from its inception, the agreement between AHI and plaintiff was void . . ..”88
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, in part, the appellate court’s decision, finding
that its earlier ruling in Berlin did not provide an exception to what was otherwise the
unlawful practice of medicine by AHI in view of its nature as anentity that was not
licensed to provide medical services to the public. Thus, the employment agreement
between the physician and AHI, and thus the non-compete clause, were unenforceable.
Where an Illinois professional corporation fails to obtain a certificate of registration,
as required by the Illinois Professional Service Corporation Act,89 that fact, standing
alone, will not provide grounds for declaring a contract between a medical group and a
physician void. That was the holding in Mary T. Riggs v. Woman To Woman, Obstetrics
and Gynecology, P.C. (Riggs),90 where the court declined to void a contract in a challenge
to a covenant not to compete. In that case, the plaintiff, a physician employed by a
medical practice brought suit, alleged fraudulent accounting practices by the medical
practice. The physician also averred that prior to employment with the medical practice,
she was misinformed by the medical group in that assurances were given to her that
the medical practice, a corporation, was registered to practice medicine in Illinois. It
was alleged that at the time the employment contract was signed, the medical practice
failed to register for a certificate with the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation
(IDPR), as required under the Professional Service Corporation Act. In the lawsuit, the
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the contract with the medical group was
void ab initio, and thus the restrictive covenant was not enforceable. The district court
granted the relief sought and certified the matter for interlocutory appeal. On appeal,
the court declined to rule in the plaintiff’s favor. The court of appeals noted that the
defendant was originally formed as a medical corporation, and it filed an application
with the IDPR for a certificate of registration. The IDPR misdirected its written
request that “minor, technical changes”91 be made to the application. The application
filed by the medical corporation expired. The IDPR was ultimately successful in
communicating with the medical corporation, and it requested that a new application be
filed, with the needed changes to the application. This was done, and a certificate was
issued to the medical corporation, after the plaintiff brought her lawsuit. The court of
appeals emphasized that no fine was imposed against the medical corporation, and no
investigation was undertaken as a result of the “inadvertent expiration”92 of the initial
application for a certificate. The court then reviewed the purposes of the Professional
Service Corporation Act. It interpreted the text of the Act, and observed that the Act was
not enacted for the protection of the public health. Rather, the statute was “primarily
permissive,” affording medical professionals an avenue, and benefits, under state law to
incorporate. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals contrasted the Act with the
State’s Medical Practice Act of 1987.93 The Medical Practice Act, in the court’s view,
was a public health statute, enacted to impose licensure requirements to ensure adequate
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training, and thereby protect the public. The Professional Service Corporation Act, on
the other hand, had a different purpose. That statute was to ensure that the owners,
directors and officers, licensed to practice in their profession, are organized solely to
render a type of service. The court wrote that “[c]learly, the intent of the legislation . .
. was not to advance the public welfare but to allow professionals to incorporate . . . to
enjoy certain . . . benefits” arising therefrom. Thus, the court rejected attempts by the
plaintiff to analogize the lack of a certificate of registration by the defendant to practice
as a medical corporation with the lack of a license to practice medicine. Since the Act
lacked a public health purpose, the court ruled that the lack of a certificate of registration
by the defendant would not result in voiding the contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant, where there was no showing of prejudice against the plaintiff. The court
of appeals in Riggs distinguished its ruling to the holding in Carter-Shields v. Alton
Health Institute, reasoning that in Carter-Shields, a general corporation incorporated
under Illinois law by non-licensed owners employed licensed physicians to practice
medicine, directly contrary to licensure laws and the corporate practice ban. In Riggs,
the professional corporation was owned by licensed physicians, and thus there was no
implication of a lay entity employing the physicians.
It is reasonable to construe the decision in Riggs as predicated not only on the
interpretation of the State’s registration law, but on the facts as well. The court of appeals
noted technical issues with the certificate of registration for the professional corporation,
and through inadvertent mishaps, a delay occurred in the issuance of a certificate. There
was no suggestion of fraud or attempts to evade state law, and the medical corporation,
as required, was owned by licensed physicians. The analysis and reasoning of the Riggs
court was embraced by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C.
v. Health Care Service Corporation,94 on a different set of facts. The issue in Chatham
concerned the registration requirements under Illinois’ Professional Service Corporation
Act (the Act),95 and a podiatric practice organized under that statute. The practice had
as a sole shareholder, officer, and director who was a duly licensed podiatrist under
the Podiatric Medical Practice Act of 1987.96 The Court in Chatham wrote that the
requirement under the Act to obtain a certificate of registration was not a regulatory
measure to protect the public health. Thus, failure to have had a certificate would not
lead to the conclusion that the professional service corporation was practicing podiatry
without a license.

VIII. FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENTS
As a corollary to the corporate practice prohibition, many states have fee-splitting rules
that impact relationships between medical professionals and other parties. These rules
differ among jurisdictions, and are an important consideration in crafting collaborations.
The fee-splitting rules are codified in statutes, and some courts have rendered decisions
on their applicability and scope. Additionally, state attorneys general have opined on the
subject. Several opinions from various jurisdictions illustrate the issues that can arise in
this area.
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A decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Illinois on fee splitting is instructive.
In Vine Street Clinic et al. v. Healthlink, Inc., 97 the Court addressed the payment
arrangement between Healthlink and its network of physicians. Healthlink engaged
physicians to join it network of providers, and marketed the services of its network to
members of health plans. The network physicians agreed to provide medical services to
health plan members, and charge the plans a discounted rate. Healthlink would process
the claims of the network physicians, and send them to the health plans for benefit
determination and payment. Plaintiff Vine Street (a partnership of physicians) and an
individual physician plaintiff were part of Healthlink’s network, and they paid Vine
Street an administrative fee for its services. Healthlink initially used a percentage-based
fee, and later switched to a fixed flat-fee arrangement. The percentage-based fee was 5
percent of the amount in HealthLink’s rate schedule for physician services provided to
plan members. The fixed flat fee was derived by considering the physician specialty, and
volume of claims submitted by the physician. In Vine Street Clinic, plaintiffs challenged
these fee arrangements, alleging that both types of fees violated the Illinois Medical
Practice Act.98 In construing section 22(A) (14) of the Act, the court in Vine Street
Clinic determined that the percentage fee was void, and deemed the fixed flat fee lawful.
The court explained that a goal of section 22(A)(14) was to guard against referrals by a
non-physician for medical services out of personal gain, and to safeguard the physician’s
independence. The court reasoned that the flat fee “fairly compensates” Healthlink and
avoids “a prohibited diversion of the physician’s remuneration.”99
The Illinois legislature in 2009 amended the Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987
regarding fee-splitting rules.100 There, the State legislature relaxed restrictions on
fee-splitting by physicians and optometrists. The newly enacted amendments permit
a percentage fee for billing and collection services, and allow only a fixed fee for
management and administrative services. Specifically, a fair market value, percentage
fee or flat fee is permitted for billing, administrative preparation and collection services,
provided the licensee maintains control over the amount of fees charged and collected,
and the charges collected are deposited in an account of, and controlled by, the licensee.
Additionally, the amendment precludes payment of a percentage fee by a licensee, but
allows a flat fee paid to a third party for marketing or management of the licensee’s
practice, allowing the licensee to be included in a network of providers and negotiating
fees on behalf of the licensee.
In Alpha Real Estate Company of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minnesota, et
al.101 the court reviewed a five percent charge formula that was at the heart of a dispute
in negotiations to purchase property being leased as a dental practice. The dispute
was between a lessee of a dental clinic, Alpha Real Estate Company, and a company
that owned the property, Delta Dental Plan. Delta owned a subsidiary, Sui Generis
Development Company. Sui Generis constructed and equipped the dental clinic, and it
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leased the property to Alpha. Delta Dental was also a health service plan that sold and
administered dental benefits to group plans. The clinic was, in turn, leased by Alpha
to a separate dental center, Apollo Dental Center, PLC, which entered into a provider
agreement with Delta Dental to provide services to plan members. A licensed dentist
owned both Alpha and Apollo. The lease agreement between Sui Generis and Alpha
contained a provision stating that if during a period of years, the adjusted cash receipts
exceeded $1 million, Alpha would pay to Sui Generis an additional five percent of
adjusted cash receipts. Alpha did not honor this provision under the lease. The owner
of Alpha, the dentist, attempted to exercise the option to purchase the property Alpha
had been leasing from Sui Generis. The owner of the leased property, Delta Dental,
conditioned the sale on Alpha’s agreement to pay, after the sale, a five-percent charge,
similar to the five percent clause in the lease agreement, on a continuing basis after the
sale. A dispute arose, and Alpha sued to enforce its option to purchase the property.
The court in Delta Dental Plan considered the five percent charge that Delta Dental
had sought as a condition of the sale. The court determined that the five percent charge
violated Minnesota’s anti-fee splitting law.102 Under the state’s statute, it was unlawful
for a dentist to divide fees, or to pay a commission to a person who sends patients to
the dentist for treatment. The court in Delta Dental Plan explained that public policy
precludes the payment of referral fee, and fee-splitting agreements require a division
of labor to be lawful. The court viewed the five percent charge as directly tied to the
amount of receipts from patients. It viewed Delta Dental, the health service plan, and
the owner of the property to be sold, as engaging in marketing efforts to refer patients to
the dental clinic. In finding the five percent charge to be in violation of Minnesota’s antifee-splitting statute, the court concluded that the law prohibited dentists from dividing
fees with those who refer patients for treatment.
Other courts have addressed the splitting of fees in the context of management services
arrangements. Virgiliu Necula, M.D. v. Martin J. Conroy et al.,103 involved a physician
and radiologist, as a provider under the New York Medicaid program. In that case,
the federal court construed and applied New York’s fee-splitting statute,104 and ruled
against the physician. The physician established a radiology practice. Under review
were contracts at different times that the physician had with two MSOs for management
services. Those agreements specified that the MSO would provide facilities, x-ray and
other medical equipment as well as non-physician staff and management of the finances
for the radiology practice. The physician agreed to pay the MSOs a fixed percentage of
his receipts for billing services and a fixed dollar amount for each procedure performed.
During the period of these management services agreements, the physician received
payments from the New York’s Medicaid program. The State audited Medicaid payments
made to the physician, and a determination was made that the physician engaged in
unlawful fee-splitting under the MSO arrangements. New York’s fee-splitting statute
prohibited sharing in fees by the physician with the MSO as payment based upon “a
percentage of, or is otherwise dependent upon, . . . income or receipts of the licensee . .
102
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. .”105 The State determined that the physician violated the fee-splitting provision. It thus
requested the physician to return Medicaid payments received and also excluded the
physician from the State Medicaid program. The physician sought review of the State’s
actions at several administrative and judicial levels. The district court granted New
York’s motion for summary judgment. The court affirmed the State’s determination that
the physician violated the state’s prohibition on fee-splitting, and upheld the remedies
and sanction imposed by the state.

IX. OBSERVATIONS
The CPMD is a state law driven concept, and is thus one that varies widely from state
to state. This variance, of necessity, requires a heightened inquiry in any given case to
determine how state law applies to a particular set of facts. Practitioners need to also
have an awareness of the fee-splitting rules adopted by many states.
The healthcare industry has looked for ways to adapt to the CPMD because of economic
forces and the mounting pressures to collaborate and integrate among medical providers.
This is no less so in the present day, with healthcare reform’s emphasis on adopting
models to promote and reward collaboration among medical providers of varied
disciplines.
Through time, the restrictive impacts of the corporate practice ban, in its absolute form,
have been reined in either by state enactment of statutory exceptions and amendments
to state laws. Legal structures have also been crafted to accommodate, or work around,
the reach of the prohibition. To be sure, the corporate practice ban is still a doctrine that
retains relevance in many states, necessitating an awareness of the prohibition by those
who are participants in healthcare delivery, and the collaborations that arise therefrom.
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